Stonehouse, and apologist Cornelius Van Til argued that there is such a radical difference, challenging Gordon H.
See Fred H. Wever, Actually, his position was ambiguous. His writings may be interpreted as supporting either universal or limited possibilism. The latter position by contrast affirms that eternal truths are necessary, but they owe their necessity to divine decree.
Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, , pp. Loux Ithaca: Cornell University Press, , p. See this article for an elegant argument against middle knowledge. Eerdmans Publishing Company, , I, 15, 8. Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity , p. Both held to the unknowability of God and so also its corollary the unknowability of his goodness. Among contemporary philosophers, Earl Conee rejects this principle in order to defend the view that an omnipotent being would have the power to bring about any state of affairs whatsoever.
It does not follow that a maximally powerful being can bring about any state of affairs, since, as observed above, bringing about some such states of affairs is impossible. Nor does it follow that a being with maximal power can bring about whatever any other agent can bring about. Within the context of that discussion, it will be assumed that it is not possible for an agent to have the power to bring about any state of affairs whatsoever.
Still, the availability of a more fine-grained and informative analysis, directly applicable to the full range of problem cases, is highly desirable. A number of prominent proposals for such a more fine-grained and informative analysis of omnipotence will be discussed later.
Power should be distinguished from ability. Power is ability plus opportunity: a being which has maximal ability but which is prevented by circumstances from exercising those abilities would not be omnipotent.
Nothing could prevent an omnipotent agent from exercising its powers, if it were to endeavor to do so. In the light of the foregoing, is it possible that there be a plurality of coexistent omnipotent agents?
Among contemporary philosophers of religion, Richard Swinburne holds that a plurality of coexistent omnipotent agents is possible. But it is absurd to suppose that an omnipotent agent could lack the power to move a feather or the power to keep it motionless. This line of reasoning appears to reduce the notion of a plurality of coexistent omnipotent agents to absurdity.
If such a reductio ad absurdum is sound, then a plurality of coexistent omnipotent agents is impossible. It might be replied that while neither of the omnipotent agents in question brings about what it endeavors to bring about, each of them can do so, since each of them has the ability to do so; they fail to bring about what they endeavor to bring about only because they lack the opportunity to do so.
If those earlier observations are correct, then, since neither of the omnipotent agents under discussion can do [in the ability plus opportunity sense] what it endeavors to do, the possible reply under discussion does not succeed.
Or it might be replied that the possible pair s of coexistent omnipotent agents would necessarily avoid stalemates of the foregoing sort in virtue of the members of each pair resembling one another in some respect. This reply seems suspiciously ad hoc. It appears that the members of any possible pair of genetically identical human twins could be stalemated, e.
Why would not the same be true of a pair of similar coexistent omnipotent agents? It might be answered that each of the members of any possible pair of coexistent omnipotent agents would be necessarily omniscient and necessarily morally perfect.
It might then be inferred that any states of affairs that a pair of coexistent omnipotent agents would endeavor to bring about at a given time are compatible. In the literature, the controversial social trinitarianism of Richard Swinburne , implies that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are a trio of coexistent omnipotent agents each of whom is necessarily omniscient and necessarily morally perfect.
However, one might object to the preceding reply on the grounds that if there is a pair of coexistent necessarily omniscient and necessarily morally perfect omnipotent agents, then there is a pair of incompatible contingent states of affairs each of which is morally optional for these agents, that is, neither morally prohibited nor morally required for them.
The objection then proceeds as follows. It may be assumed that that the feather moves at t and that the feather remains motionless at t are a pair of states of affairs of the sort in question. Apparently, also, possibly, under such circumstances, the state of affairs that the omnipotent agents in question are stalemated in their endeavors to affect the feather as to its motion or rest at t is morally optional for those agents. The foregoing defense of the possibility of a plurality of coexistent omnipotent agents is persuasive only if there is a cogent reply to this objection.
It appears not. After all, there appear to be incompatible, contingent, aesthetically optional states of affairs, i. Moreover, it is not clear that futile striving necessarily has negative aesthetic value, witness, e. Further doubts about the possibility of a plurality of coexistent omnipotent beings are raised by considerations outlined below which seem to show that if some possible world is maximally good, in other words, is a best possible world, then no possible world is [uniquely] the best possible world, and likewise with respect to a possible world that is second best, third best, and so on.
Here it is assumed that if there is a best possible world, then there is at least one such possible world containing contingently existing individual substantial individuals. A parallel assumption is made about any possible world good enough to be actualized by an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, aesthetically perfect being, e. But, with respect to any possible world containing contingently existing substantial individuals, it appears that there is another possible world exactly resembling it but populated by different contingently existing substantial individuals.
It further appears that the value of one of these worlds is equal to the value of another of these worlds. So, it appears that if one of these possible worlds is best, second best, third best, etc. Moreover, different possible goods combined in different possible ways may constitute different, logically independent, possible total goods of the same value. The following simple example illustrates this point. Generalizing from examples of this kind, it appears that if some possible world is best, second best, third best, and so on, then there are other possible worlds, not exactly resembling them , which are best, second best, third best, and so on.
So, for any possible pair of coexistent God-like omnipotent agents, it appears that one member of that pair could endeavor to actualize a different, equally good, world than the other member of that pair, even given their hypothesized necessary epistemic, moral, and aesthetic perfection. In the light of the reductio ad absurdum presented earlier, it appears to follow that such pairs are impossible. Leibniz argued that there is a uniquely optimal possible world by appealing to the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Identity of Indiscernibles , notoriously concluding that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds.
Among contemporary philosophers, both the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Identity of Indiscernibles are controversial. Another possible defense of the possibility of a plurality of coexistent omnipotent agents appeals to quantum mechanics.
Quantum entanglement seems to be a unique physical phenomenon whereby concurrent activities of diverse contingently existing substantial individuals are directly coordinated in virtue of a necessary linkage of some sort between those substantial individuals.
By drawing an analogy with this phenomenon, one might argue that there could be coexistent omnipotent agents who necessarily avoid stalemates. Quantum mechanics implies that there exist pairs of entangled micro-particles such that it is causally necessary that one member of the pair is spin up if and only if the other member of the pair is spin up , independently of the locations of those micro-particles. But quantum mechanics further implies that there are entangled pairs of micro-particles such that it is causally necessary that one member of the pair is spin up if and only if the other member of the pair is spin down.
The properties of being spin up and being spin down are contraries. Given this conclusion, and in the light of the reductio ad absurdum of the possibility of a plurality of coexistent omnipotent agents presented earlier, an argument in favor of such a possibility by analogy with quantum entanglement undermines itself, thereby reinforcing that reductio.
So, one cannot credibly defend the metaphysical possibility of a plurality of coexistent omnipotent agents by drawing an analogy with the phenomenon of quantum entanglement.
Finally, could one credibly defend such a metaphysical possibility via the hypothesis that it is metaphysically possible for there to be a plurality of necessarily indiscernible omnipotent God-like beings in the Leibnizian sense of indiscernible? Because a plurality of necessarily indiscernible objects is of dubious intelligibility, such a defense would not be credible.
Doubts about the intelligibility of such a plurality arise because of perplexities concerning the individuation and separation of any pair of necessarily indiscernible objects, and because positing the existence of a plurality of such objects is metaphysically extravagant and gratuitous. Indeed it seems that there is just as much reason to posit indefinitely many objects of the sort in question as there is to posit a pair of them, whereas the intelligibility of a necessarily self-indiscernible object is not in doubt.
A representative example of a hypothetical plurality of necessarily indiscernible objects is a plurality of necessarily coincident geometrical points. In addition to the perplexities concerning the individuation and separation of any pair of such points, the assumption that it is metaphysically possible for there to be a plurality of necessarily coincident points is metaphysically frivolous.
Post-Scholastic ridicule of the sort that was directed at the alleged ontological excesses of the Schoolmen, e. On the other hand, perhaps no such emendation is necessary. Many philosophers have defended an account of de re belief about an object in terms of having some de dicto belief about that object while also bearing a relation of acquaintance to it, that is, while being epistemically en rapport with the object see Chisholm , Lewis , and Kaplan Perhaps, God has an immediate or direct awareness of everything and that relation is sufficiently intimate to put him into epistemic rapport with everything.
On this last point, see Wierenga Another recent concern is whether it really is possible to know all truths. Grim has objected to the possibility of omniscience on the basis of an argument that concludes that there is no set of all truths. Suppose there were such a set. The assumption that it is leads to the conclusion that it is not. Now Grim thinks that this is a problem for omniscience because he thinks that a being could know all truths only if there were a set of all truths.
In reply, Plantinga Plantinga and Grim holds that knowledge of all truths does not require the existence of a set of all truths. Plantinga notes that a parallel argument shows that there is no set of all propositions, yet it is intelligible to say, for example, that every proposition is either true or false. A more technical reply in terms of levels of sets has been given by Simmons , but it goes beyond the scope of this entry.
See also Wainwright 50—51 and Oppy — As Flint puts it, to see God as provident is to see him as knowingly and lovingly directing each and every event involving each and every creature toward the ends he has ordained for them Flint Defining Omniscience 2. Additional Features of Divine Knowledge 3. Foreknowledge and Human Free Action 4.
Further Difficulties for Omniscience 4. Additional Features of Divine Knowledge Omniscience is supposed to be knowledge that is maximal or complete. Foreknowledge and Human Free Action Knowledge of all true propositions would seem to include knowledge of all truths about the future, at least if there are truths about the future. They each considered an argument that may be represented where S is any person and A is any action as: 1 If God has foreknowledge that S will do A , then it is necessary that S will do A.
Further Difficulties for Omniscience Philosophical issues involving foreknowledge and free action are of long-standing interest, with a history of discussion from late antiquity through the present day. Brentano, Philosophische Untersuchungen , English translation in Chisholm According to this objection, then, some propositions change their truth values over time, and a being who knows all true propositions accordingly changes beliefs.
Of course, if D1 does not capture de re knowledge, it would be simple enough to add an another clause to it … and for every thing x and every property P , if x has P , then x is such that S knows that x has P. Bibliography Alston, William P. Anselm, c. Evans eds. Aquinas, Thomas, c. Anderson trans. Davies and B. Leftow eds. Augustine, c. Williams trans. Boethius, c. Walsh trans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chisholm eds. Davis, Stephen T.
Flint, Thomas P. Freddoso, Alfred J. Freddoso trans. Gale, Richard M. Hoffman, Joshua and Gary S. Morris ed. Mawson, T. Pinnock, Clark H. Eerdmans, Rowe, William L. Andrews in , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kvanvig ed. Wainwright, William J. Wierenga, Edward R. Ganssle and David M. Woodruff eds. The idea of an all-loving God can be found in many different parts of the Bible:. Christians believe that God loved humanity so much that he chose to send Jesus to Earth so that people could have eternal life.
The term omniscience refers to the idea that God is all-knowing. The idea of an all-knowing God is mentioned in the Bible:. Christians believe this all-knowing power goes beyond what we can imagine as humans. God knows if someone loses a single hair, and knows people's thoughts before they speak them.
The term omnipresence refers to the belief that God is everywhere. Christians believe that God is present everywhere in the world, at all times. The idea of an all-present God is mentioned in the Bible:.
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